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The Quest for Meaning 
 
A quest is a special kind of journey –according to the original 
denotation- a journey in search of a specific good. The best-known 
example in Europe is the Quest for the Holy Grail, made famous by 
the Arthur Legend. In that tale the Holy Gail stands for a mysterious 
but very precious good, and the Quest for the ultimate dedication to 
find that good. What the Grail is or can offer is not unequivocal. But 
Arthur and his knights know that there is no higher purpose in life 
than the search for the Grail, and that the search is as important as 
the finding. They also know the Grail will only reveal Its purpose 
after it is found, and that It only can be found by those who have the 
right motivation and demonstrate the right behaviour during their 
quest. Only a knight with a noble heart and noble behaviour can find 
It. It is all about excellence. A second important aspect of the Quest 
for the Holy Grail –in fact any quest- is that both the quest and 
purpose of that quest (the good) are embedded in a specific broader 
narrative. In the case of the Quest for the Holy Grail Christianity 
supplies that overarching story. The Holy Grail is (often but not 
always) equated with the vessel Christ used during the Last Supper. 
In other quests the ‘grail’ and the narrative differ. In for instance the 
Gilgamesh Epos, the ‘grail’ is an herb that bestows immortality, and 
the overarching story is the question what humanity and civilisation 
mean, whereby the City of Ur represents civilisation and everything 
outside its city walls represents wilderness. A third aspect of a quest 
is that it has to fit in an accepted, inherited set of examples, social 
norms, habits, routines, which give direction to the quest and a 
ground to the narrative. In the case of Holy Grail, only knights, and 
only those who are virgin and pure of heart, are allowed to engage 
in the Quest. They have to stick to certain norms and behave in 
prescribed ways. 
 
We use the example of the quest as a motto, because it clearly articulates the central 
findings of BIOMOT, the fact that all motivated people, in fact all people, have the 
same urge for meaningful action, i.e. meaningful for themselves and for others and for 
the environment they live in, and the fact that this urge is rooted in a combination of 
supportive narratives, examples, experiences, and shared rules or norms. Change 
these conditions and the nature and orientation of the motivation will change. Destroy 
the conditions and motivation will fade away. Some conditions are better than other to 
motivate people. If conditions, for instance, offer no room for meaningful nature 
related stories, practices and norms, motivations to act for nature or support nature 
oriented actions will dwindle. 
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Introduction 
 
The need to motivate people to act for biodiversity is widely acknowledged, and 
many efforts have been done to achieve this. The results however still are 
disappointing. People and society remain reluctant to come into action for 
biodiversity, even if they know that this is the rational thing to do. It looks as if the 
motivational power of rationality, reasoning, or utility, is rather thin when it comes to 
actually motivating people to act for biodiversity.  
The goal of BIOMOT is to come up with solutions to break this stalemate, and 
provide answers that work to really motivate people to act for biodiversity.  
We decided that the best method to understand the motivations of people and 
organisations (of and by people) to act for biodiversity was to study the motivations 
of people (and groups of people) who demonstrably had undertaken that kind of 
action. What kind of motivations triggered them, and what barred them? This was the 
first focus.  
We also decided to focus our attention on the motivations of individuals, 
especially highly motivated individuals. This decision was based on the insight, 
derived from the literature and previous studies of some of the BIOMOT partners, 
that real transformation always originates from highly motivated individuals.  
A third decision was to extend the research scope from motivations to act for 
biodiversity to motivations to act for nature. This decision was also based on literature 
and previous studies of Biomot partners. The motivational potential of biodiversity is 
limited, because of its abstract meaning, it mainly appeals to reason. However, this 
rational appeal will only motivate few people, mostly higher educated people or 
professional in the field of biodiversity. Nature is a much broader notion with a strong 
and historically proven motivational appeal. And we also know that people willing to 
act for nature, will also include biodiversity in that willingness, since diversity is next 
to authenticity and otherness a main appeal of nature, aesthetically and ethically.  
So, we decided to look at the motivations of passionate individuals, active for 
nature, to find out what triggered them to act, i.e. to become engaged and translate 
that engagement into action, and to find out what kept them going over the years, and 
or what blocked them from doing so, and how they inspired others. We compared 
their motivations with those of other people, motivated for other causes, and with the 
motivations of people who were by profession or coincidence active for nature, 
without necessarily being motivated to do so. This last group was explicitly targeted 
by Biomot work package 2 (WP2), which investigated the motivations, policies, 
governance and social learning processes in 35 biodiversity projects in the seven 
countries involved in the Biomot project.  
We started our investigation by studying the connection between values and interests. 
This choice was prompted by the fact that the most prevailing view on human 
motivation nowadays is that people are motivated by values or interests, and that they 
act on the basis of a more or less consciousness comparative appraisal of these 
interests or values. This offered a good argument to start there. We, however, 
enriched this view with the help of a more philosophical line of approach, which 
makes a distinction between the view that people act or are supposed to act because of 
(rationally grounded) reasons and the reverse view that people first and above all act 
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because of sentimental reasons, irrespective of the question whether those reasons are 
rational, and often fit to be rationalized.  
We also decided that we wanted to confront this value oriented line of approach 
with a different, competing outlook on motivated action, derived from environmental 
ethics, i.e. the idea that motivated people are not driven by values /interests or 
sentiments, but by ‘contextually and narratively embedded’ meaning, by a search for 
meaning, an urge to understand – not to determine- what is true, so-called 
Wahrheitsverstehen (see Gadamer, 1960). People act in a certain way because it is 
‘natural for them’. They value what they do because it is depicted as meaningful by 
the stories, traditions, examples, norms, and practices that surround them.  
We started the research into the motivational power of values and interests by 
investigating the role of economic values and valuation. We started there, because 
stressing the economic value has become the dominant approach to stimulate people 
to act, also in mainstream contemporary policies addressing environmental issues, 
including those regarding ecology and biodiversity. This approach reflects the widely 
shared view that putting the right prices on environmental issues will automatically 
trigger the right behaviour, and that getting the prices right for ‘goods’ is merely a 
question of creating a market for these ‘goods’. Once there is a market, optimal 
environmental outcomes will be generated by the interplay between supply and 
demand. No need to stimulate or change motivations or behaviour by means of 
argumentation, education or force, the market will do the job1.  
This discourse has indeed become so overriding that even the proposition that 
motivations or arguments are important to enhance or protect biodiversity or nature is 
sometimes shoved aside. At the same time however, it is clear that stressing economic 
valuation and marketization does not solve the issues they are supposed to solve, does 
not motivate the broader public to act, and in practice demotivates them, and even 
block the articulation of alternatives. 
These and other economic valuation related questions Biomot took up, mainly in 
work package 1 (WP1).  
 
  
                                                        
1 The main remaining problems are: the double question of translating not-yet-economic values in marketable economic terms, 
i.e. use and exchange values, and dealing with issues that defy this type of translation; the problem of handling market failure; 
the problem of distributive justice, i.e. what to do with people with no or bad access to the market; and finally the problem of 
handling people who resist or revolt. 
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Findings 
Motivation cannot be bought 
WP1 investigated the different connotations of the notion of value, more in special the 
notions of economic values and valuation and their impact on motivations to act for 
biodiversity or nature. The results are remarkable and endorse the central idea of 
BIOMOT, i.e. the idea that significant action for nature and biodiversity ‘cannot be 
objectivised or bought’ but requires the dedicated action of motivated people (see D. 
1.1).  
The hope that economic environmental valuation can become so effective that it 
no longer is necessary to appeal to other arguments or non-economic motivations 
turns out to be vain, according to the findings in WP1. Economic environmental 
evaluation (EEV), and its little sister total economic valuation, (TEV) are not suited to 
measure, and as a result guide complex ecological behaviour. Current marginal 
changes in an ecosystem can be tracked, but future erratic behaviour cannot. Local 
extinctions and loss of ecosystem adaptability can occur unobserved, leading to 
unexpected state changes. Reactions to perturbations in the ecosystem can lag in time, 
depending on generation times and seasons. Therefore, relying on EEV or TEV 
information does not safeguard the maintaining of ecosystem services into the future. 
EEV and TEV give only a snapshot view and supply no information about the state of 
the ecosystem itself. 
WP1 makes also clear that the notion of value, used in a dominantly economic 
context or discourse, will crowd out or monetize all other values. Putting services on 
the market, fundamentally changes the nature of these services, and overrules and 
push aside values and meanings that are not expressed or expressible in monetary 
terms. The implications of these findings are far reaching, certainly if we combine 
them with the above-made remarks on economic environmental evaluation (EEV and 
TEV). It implies that efforts to qualify ecosystem services in monetary terms changes 
the nature of these services, erodes the possibility to value these services in other than 
monetary terms, reduces the range of possible motivations to cost-benefits analyses; 
and -as if this is not yet far-reaching enough- does not prevent future ecosystem 
losses, or even complete ecosystem breakdowns (see also Knights, 2013). 
The problem with values 
The findings of WP1 are even more sweeping. The notion of value itself turns out to 
be problematic, when it comes to understanding or stimulating motivations to act for 
nature or biodiversity. This is problematic because the notion of value is the central 
building brick in all contemporary efforts to measure the value of ecosystems, 
biodiversity or nature, and in most efforts to motivate people, groups or firms into 
action. When we talk about motivating people we look at values, and try to use these 
as a lever to uplift their motivations.  
A central problem with values is that we tend to define and use them in abstract, 
itemized ways. We see values as a kind of independent ‘objects’, detachable and 
detached from societal practices and norms. But the consequence of this approach is 
that values, because of their disconnected and abstract nature, have the tendency to 
proliferate and conflict with each other, and even become incommensurable, since 
they have no inbuilt criterion to check themselves or become comparable. That 
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requires the presence of an outside standard, beyond and above the value(s), with an 
undisputable authority’ i.e. higher value. To give an example: all metric measurement 
is based on the presence of The Meter. That Meter does indeed exists. It is a very 
unique, very concrete specimen, still conserved in Paris, not supposed to change in 
length. But precisely that kind of standard we lack to measure and compare (value) 
our contemporary detached, (possibly endless) lists of abstract, itemized values. This 
is already true for the values we cherish as a person, but even more so for the values 
different people or different groups foster. Solving this double-edged problem of 
value plurality and value commensurability is problematic, since every solution, every 
choice, and every comparison in itself is also based on a valuation, on values or a 
value.  
Rational deliberation and context 
One at first sight plausible way to overcome this problem, and in fact a very common 
way to do this, is to appeal to a cost-benefit analysis. But the problem with that type 
of analysis is that it again presupposes the presence of an overarching standard, an 
ultimate value, to measure, weigh, compare and aggregate the gains and losses of 
each option, in order to come to the optimal solution. If this standard is lacking, 
values become incommensurable and rational decision-making impossible. And there 
are very strong reasons to suppose that such a standard indeed is lacking in cost-
benefit analyses. Most so-called ultimate values are, on closer consideration, just 
instrumental values in disguise, not ultimate at all, and in other words not suitable; or 
a so-called ultimate value turns out to be a composite of other values (a hybrid), in 
other words, again not to be an ultimate value.  
There are other rational approaches, which do not have this problem, at least at 
first sight, and can deal with this type of value incommensurability and with value 
plurality.  
The first one is the procedural account, which holds that a rational decision can be 
made on the basis of deliberation that meets the norms of rational discussion (O’Neill 
2007: 30; see also Simon 1979: 68). The second one is the expressive account of 
rationality, which holds that a rational decision is one that ‘adequately expresses one’s 
rational attitudes towards the people and things one cares about’ (Anderson1993: 18). 
And a third, alternative approach, defended by O’Neill, Holland and Light (2008:85), 
argues that it is enough ‘to have a partial ordering whereby what we have is ‘a set of 
admissible solutions which themselves are not ordered. This judgment should be 
tutored and informed, and based upon developed capacities of perception and 
knowledge founded in education and experience (O’Neill 1993: 117).  
However, The first two alternatives in fact run into the same obstacles as the cost-
benefit analysis. They refer to an ultimate value, in this case respectively rational 
discussion and rational attitudes, themselves referring to a notion of care. What a 
rational discussion is or what makes a discussion rational depends on the arguments 
used, the perspectives on rationality of the participants (and their audience and social 
environment), and their willingness to behave in a certain way. The same can be said 
of rational attitudes, although the notion of care seems to offer a benchmark, but one 
that transcends rationality. There is no guarantee, in both cases that the problem of 
instrumentality and hybridity does not pop up. On the contrary, both problems seem 
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to be omnipresent. Besides, everything said just before, already assumes that ‘being 
rational’ is already accepted as a standard, in other words is automatically good.  
The third alternative avoids this deadlock, but this comes at a price. It refers back 
to tradition and practices, i.e. education and experiences. In other words, it re-embeds 
values in a very specific gauge: social context, locality and a narrative. That 
‘standard’ validates the values, and makes them tangible and related (de-itemized). 
They fit in a story and derive their meaning form a sharing meaning (shared 
narrative), shared practices and experiences, and a shared knowledge-tradition, 
handed over by education or otherwise. 
In summary: free-floating values, i.e. values detached from their (social) context 
are a problem when it comes to motivation. They have to be grounded. But that can 
only be done by referring to a foundation outside the values, a transcendent 
underpinning, beyond and before; and that ground is lacking. 
De re or de dicto 
One other, not yet-mentioned solution to overcome the problem of valuing the value 
of values without the need to refer to a specific context, is the so-called de re /de dicto 
distinction, made by some philosophers. This is the idea that values referring directly 
to a concrete object, a so-called re, are stronger and have more motivating power than 
values referring to an idea, an abstraction. However, even if this is true the question 
raises (again) why that is the case, and whether context is not again the deeper reason, 
the real explanation, for instance for the fact that I love my child more than children 
in general, or the fact that I love a forest I know more than forests in general. Besides 
the distinction between de re and de dicto can become blurred, especially for higher 
educated people or in cases or ‘things’ with a degree of complexity, such as nature or 
biodiversity, or to take another example, money. Is money a re, or a dicto, even when 
I talk about my own money?  
We dedicated a special chapter in this booklet at distinction between de re and de 
dicto motivations (see below Part II), because it showed that many of our 
interviewees, motivated to act for nature, are indeed motivated by de re motivations, 
even in cases where it seems as if their motivations are de dicto.   
Money nor market 
It is, because of the above-mentioned reasons, not that surprising that values and 
valuation methods more often do not motivate people into action or only inspire some 
of them, or worse: awaken resistance, reluctance, or passivity. We already discussed 
the tendency of economic monetary based valuation to suppress and even push aside 
all other types of valuation and values. We, however, did not discuss the fact that this 
insight is not all that new or unknown, but that this does not hold back decision 
makers -in the profit and non-profit sector alike- to massively embrace the monetary 
option, and introduce market approaches and norms all over the place, even there 
where they do no fit in, or do more harm than good. They even do this when they 
know that they are clearly crossing the line.  
They probably do this out of pure pragmatic reasons. The market is indeed all 
overriding; you have to comply as decision maker; that is what pragmatism is about. 
They also do it because money has this inbuilt tendency to equalize everything and 
treat everything alike, even the incommensurable, i.e. all values, irrespectively of 
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their differences. It delivers the ultimate standard for (pragmatic) decision-making, 
better than even the most sophisticated rationality can forge. It is simply very handy 
to have this kind of standard at hand as a policy maker, the more so because it is a 
standard you do not have to reflect upon, or defend, at length. Its value seems self-
evident, neutral and omnipresent. It fits neatly the dominant discourse of our time, 
like the idea that the Pope is the head of the Catholic Church for a Roman Catholic. 
However, the costs are high, even higher than described above. The first obstacle 
is as clear as it is insurmountable within the logic that has erected this barricade. 
Everyone and everything with no currency, little currency, or less currency has no or 
less access to a value market. This is a very simple, indeed self-evident truth, but one 
with very far-reaching consequences. The market only serves those who have access 
to that market, and those with the best access are served the best. Installing a market 
and letting it do ‘its job’ is a political and moral choice: a market is not morally neural 
or beyond moral categorisation. It is an imagined reality, a social construct. 
It is indeed very advisable for every decision maker to take the time to let this 
self-evident truth and its consequences really sink in, and let it re-shape her or his 
choices. It implies that even the most perfect market is unjust in certain ways and 
produces injustice; it has an inbuilt tendency to do and reproduce injustice, which hits 
the less off hard, and the most less off the hardest. The opposite reasoning is also true: 
the richer you are, the more you profit. The victims are the poor, but above all the 
non-human species with no access to this market and in fact every market whatsoever. 
Humans decide for them, i.e. the humans who construct, order, rule the market; the 
ones with power and money. You do not even have to refer to intrinsic values of 
nature or non-human species to understand this, to see that translating values in 
market values or marketable functions or ‘services’ is exclusive and disadvantageous 
for many human poor and most of the non-human species. And it is a problem that 
cannot be solved by adapting or extending the market or the market mechanism.  
Discourses on monetary valuation 
This insight is again not that new, since we also found it back, when analysing the 
different discourses in seven EU countries about monetary valuation, amongst 
academic, governmental and private sector economists; representatives from NGOs 
and other groups critical of the economic valuation of nature; and other figures 
prominently involved in the economic valuation of nature debate (see Biomot D 1.2). 
We found four discourses, of which the dominant, the economic valuation discourse, 
indeed states that market failure is a major cause of environmental problems and 
bringing the environment into the market system the solution.  
The other three discourses doubt or even reject this claim. The discourse on value 
pluralism sees money as an inappropriate metric, and as a tool that undermines 
feelings of obligation, fails to respect that people value the particular irreplaceable 
history of the places they know, and an approach that dangerously assumes that no 
natural place is valued as unique or irreplaceable. The discourse on social justice 
underlines the remarks already made that the expansion of market institutions into the 
environmental domain represents a further transfer of power to corporations and the 
very rich; and that the harms will fall most severely upon the current poor and future 
generations. The third discourse, labelled eco-deliberation, claims that a participatory 
approach for environmental decision making should be adopted, and that economic 
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valuations of ecosystems do not provide an indication of the ability of the ecosystem 
to provide ecosystem services into the future.  
Three out of four discourses on economic valuation, popular amongst 
environmental professionals, question, doubt or bluntly reject the idea that monetary 
or even economic valuation will solve or is the way to improve environmental 
problems. However, the one in favour of market solutions is the dominant discourse, 
Al the economists in our sample supported it, and also rather insensitive for the 
assumptions and arguments of the other discourses. Discourses are noteworthy 
difficult to reconcile, but this even truer for some discourses. Above we already gave 
some reasons to why economic, and more in special monetary valuation, is so 
powerful and attractive, below we will give more. The first step to do so is based on 
some insights provided by (social) psychology. 
Crowding out 
We have already discussed in BIOMOT D.2 the values-model of Schwartz. But what 
we have not discussed in depth yet is the idea that values always come in clusters, and 
always stand in opposition to other vales and clusters of values. Some values are 
closely related and have the tendency to link up, such as for instance the values of 
benevolence, universalism and self-direction, or their antipodes: achievement, power 
and security. To use the words of Schwartz himself “the closer any two values in 
either direction around the circle, the more similar their underlying motivations. The 
more distant any two values, the more antagonistic their underlying motivations” 
(Schwartz, 2006, p. 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
The implications of these findings are huge. It implies that the tendency to link up 
with related values and crowd out opposing values is not restricted to monetary 
values: all values have this tendency.  
It also becomes clear that values such as hedonism (defined as personal pleasure), 
The BIOMOT project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement # 282625  
 
 
14 
achievement (defined as personal success), and power (social status, prestige, control 
or dominance over people and resources) exactly oppose the values that esteem and 
promote the wellbeing of others, people and nature. Moreover, it puts a new light on 
the hope or belief that you can combine or even merge those two clusters of opposite 
values into one tool or toolbox to motivate people into action. That hope becomes 
rather naive, to put it mildly, because the values we need to appreciate nature and 
biodiversity stand opposite to the values we need to live a life of pleasure or become 
socially and economically successful.  
If we combine this insight with the conclusions drawn by WP1 that monetary and 
economic valuations have the tendency to proliferate at the cost of other valuations, 
and the knowledge that we live in a society that above anything else values personal 
luck, social-economic achievement, and prestige, expressible in competitive and 
monetary terms, it becomes clear that we have not quite generated the proper starting 
conditions to motivate people into action for nature and biodiversity, as well on an 
individual as collective level.  
Goals and the common good 
One could argue that all the above-made remarks only refer to values, and that 
motivations are about more than values, in fact more about goal setting. However, the 
findings off Schwartz are confirmed by the findings of Grouzet (2005), who 
investigated goal setting. Grouzet researched and classified the goals of 1800 students 
in 15 countries, also non-western countries, according to a division based on a 
distinction between on the one hand intrinsic and extrinsic goals, and on the other 
hand self-oriented and self-transcendent goals. A distinction he derived from the very 
influential studies of Deci and Ryan. Grouzet looked at the strivings, i.e. the 
motivations, of these students, not their values. Grouzet also represented his findings 
in the shape of a wheel, because he also found that related goals cluster, that they 
stand in opposition to other goals, and try to push aside their antipodes. Here, I will 
use the slightly reworked version, made by Tim Crompton (2010), who complies 
several of the ‘Grouzet-wheels’, into one figure.  
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Some similarities between the ‘wheels’ of Schwartz and Grouzet are striking, 
although we also saw some remarkable differences, such as the places of hedonism 
and self-acceptance, and the place of conformity2. However, in overall both models 
show the same tendency and – what is even more important – the same pairs of 
clusters and opposites, certainly when it comes to values or goals required to act for 
nature or biodiversity. 
Grouzet in fact confirms the findings of Schwartz. The search for status, prestige 
and financial success (extrinsic and self-oriented goals) stands sharply opposed to the 
striving to do something for the other (community or nature), i.e. intrinsic and self-
transcendent goals. Grouzet also provides an important additional insight. A person 
will start to do things that transcend her/his self-interest only if it is willed or required 
to ‘fit in’ socially. 
Demotivation 
This implies that people in theory can act for nature out of selfish reasons, but also 
that the options to motivate people into action for nature –or any common good- 
become slim, if the striving for self-acceptance is best served by gaining status and 
personal (financial) success, and going for pleasure, health, safety and affiliation; in 
other words, if these types of intrinsic and extrinsic goals overlap. That is precisely 
what is happening nowadays, almost all over the world.  
In her book Eco-Republic (2012) the philosopher Melissa Lane also draws this 
conclusion. In this book she discusses the best way to reorganize the commitment of 
individuals, and how to enable them to act for the common good and nature. She also 
underlines that values can be mutually reinforcing, but also stand in opposition to 
other –clusters of related- values. Adherence to specific values excludes the support 
of other values, and the strengthening of certain specific (clusters of) values weakens 
opposite (clusters of) values. Money, economic output and fame belong to a cluster 
that stands opposite to a cluster encompassing benevolence, community sense and 
care. Even there where a cluster of values, which according to the model of Grouzet 
(see above) supports as well intrinsic3 or extrinsic strivings, are adjacent, the cluster 
of financial values and personal achievement and pleasure still remains the complete 
opposite of benevolence and community- and care-oriented values. I.e. the values 
needed to motivate people into sustainable action for nature or any other common 
good. 
According to Melissa Lane our society stimulated precisely the wrong values to 
motivate people into action for nature, if only by motivating exactly those values that                                                         
2 These differences have partly to do with differences qua definition (for instance with regard to the notion of conformity, 
restraint to harm others, or conventions for Schwartz, and an effort to fit in for Grouzet), and partly with differences in the 
overall classification system. The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic, and between self-oriented and self-transcendent 
goals makes it very difficult for Grouzet not to classify self-acceptance in the self-oriented and intrinsic quadrant. The same 
reasoning is true for Schwartz, but pointing into another direction. His division between on the one hand openness to change and 
self-transcendence and on the other hand conservation and self-enhancement, makes it almost obligatory to rank self-direction in 
the category of openness to change. One could say that the typologies for the self of Schwartz offer better opportunities to 
discriminate between the different roles of that self. 
3 Intrinsic goals are defined as those pursuits that are generally congruent with the psychological needs for relatedness, 
autonomy, and competence proposed by self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) and thus are inherently satisfying to 
pursue, in and of themselves. Intrinsic goals include those for self-acceptance, affiliation, community feeling, and physical 
health. In contrast, extrinsic goals are primarily concerned with obtaining some reward or social praise; because they are 
typically a means to some other end or compensate for problems in need satisfaction; they are less likely to be inherently 
satisfying (see Deci & Ryan, 2000). (Grouzet, 2005, p. 801) 
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oppose the values required for nature action oriented action. Contemporary society 
drums in the wrong values and striving, or in her words: “it stimulates the wrong 
virtues”. Our societies seem to be organized to demotivate individuals to act for 
nature or biodiversity, in fact any common good. “The environmental movement must 
beware of appealing to materialistic motivations, as these are inherently hostile to the 
very notion of intrinsic goods, intrinsic motivation, and identities based on anything 
other than the rewards of consumerism” (Lane, 2012, p. 121)  
Our contemporary western society goes even further according to Lane. The 
overall and permanently repeated message is that any individual is too trivial a player 
to make socially any difference. Therefore, the permanently repeated message is that 
individual people do not have to care for the common good, nor should they feel 
guilty about not doing so. Taking care for the collective good is the task of other 
players or platforms, institutional players, such as the state, expert-groups or the 
market. We in fact live in a society that on the one hand promotes the freedom of 
choice and action of the individual and on the other hand belittles the capacity of that 
same individual to make a difference, with the exception of so-called super-heroes or 
geniuses, comparable with antique semi-gods.  
Meaning and story 
Lane also makes clear that this deadlock cannot be broken by means of arguments, 
certainly not by arguments that run counter to the values people consider essential for 
their identity, or arguments intended to undermine values people cherish by stressing 
the irrationality of those values. Do this and aiming at that will in fact have the 
opposite effect, it will only strengthen the will to stick to these values. 
Lane wants to overcome this stalemate by means of new stories and images that 
stress self-transcendent goals and values. In this sense her recommendation links up 
with the ideas discussed before, the idea that values have to be embedded in a context 
and supported by narratives. She adds however two extra dimensions, i.e. the idea that 
its best can be done via the notion of virtue, and the idea that the kick-off to generate 
this change has to come from individuals, not institutions.  
Those values and motivations that stimulate and support care (for people or 
nature) need longstanding and enduring nourishment and support, in words and deeds. 
This will strengthen these values and motivations, and weaken their antipodes. In 
other words, the strategy is not to downplay so-called negative values and strivings, 
but to promote their opposites. And the suitable way to do this is not via debate and 
argumentation, but via meaningful narratives and sustained practices, intended to 
embed these values and strivings in personal and societal habits, routines and norms; 
i.e. by educating and training the right virtues. 
These processes have to be initiated by precursors, individuals who set the ‘trend’, 
and break the above-mentioned demotivational dead lock, which disheartens people to 
act for the common good. Their stories and practices should be studied, adopted and 
adapted, scaled up, and translated in social learning processes. 
Virtue and meaning 
The qualities required to promote the common good resemble, not surprisingly, 
according to Lane, the so-called classical virtues. They need practice and training to 
realize their potential, like the classical virtues did. A potential that is partly 
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incorporated in the practices aimed at bringing them about and partly exceeds and 
directs those practices, like muscles need training and make that training possible and 
gain in strength the more they get trained (see also Sandel, 2010, p 4). Excellence 
(virtue) is to be found and realized in the combination of goal, potential, and exercise; 
in short the goal of the undertaking, and the undertaking itself, i.e. in the quest.  
The qualities needed for the promotion of the common good also have, qua 
constitution, much in common with the classical virtues, according to Lane. The 
cluster of qualities needed to promote that common good are more or less those of the 
four classical cardinal virtues, i.e. justice, or the capacity to do the good and correct 
wrong-doing; temperance, in order, to use the words of Durkheim “to pursue conduct 
towards enduring goals”; fortitude or courage, to overcome fear and resistance, and 
stick to the right choices and practices; and prudence or wisdom, the capacity to see 
what will promote and what will hinder the realization of the good. She adds one 
(cardinal) Christian virtue, the virtue of charity or care. She in fact swaps the classical 
virtue of friendship for charity. 
This view on the virtues relies deeply on the ideas of Plato, but even more 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. What is essential in this type of virtue ethics is the 
way the relationship between means, ends and actions is defined. Virtues are 
simultaneously means, goals and practices, or otherwise formulated as well ends as 
means, or to use the words of Alasdair Macintyre who revived the idea of virtue 
ethics: “For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its 
best, and the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a 
mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life. We thus cannot characterize the good 
for man adequately without already having made reference to the virtue. The 
immediate outcome of the exercise of a virtue is a choice, which issues in right action: 
‘It is the correctness of the end of the purposive choice of which virtue is the cause’ 
(l228a1, Kenny's translation, Kenny 1978), wrote Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics… 
Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular 
ways. To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against inclination; it 
is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues. Moral education is 
an 'education sentimentale'.” (After Virtue, 1984, p. 149) 
In other words a virtue should not be confused with an inborn disposition or a 
natural talent. “A happy gift of fortune is not to be confused with the possession of the 
corresponding virtue; for just because it is not informed by systematic training and by 
principle even such fortunate individuals will be the prey of their own emotions and 
desires” (Macintyre, 1984, p. 149).  
Self-determination 
These ideas are in line with the central findings of BIOMOT. But before we go into 
that, we have to discuss the relationship between motivation and self-determination as 
worked out by Deci and Riyan (1985, 2000). Their motivational theory, called self-
determination theory, forms the backbone of part of the analyses in BIOMOT, 
certainly in work package 2 (WP2). 
Ryan and Deci define motivation as to being moved to do something (Ryan and 
Deci, 2000, p. 54), and make a distinction between different types of motivations, 
based on the underlying reasons or goals (1985, 2000). The most important distinction 
they make is between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. They define intrinsic 
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motivations as the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions, rather than for 
some separable consequence (2000, p. 56). They define extrinsic motivations as a 
construct that pertains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable 
outcome (p. 60). Intrinsic values will occur only for activities that hold intrinsic 
interest for an individual, -those “that have the appeal of choice, opportunity, novelty, 
challenge, or aesthetic value for that individual” (p. 59). Furthermore they state that 
events and structures that stimulate feelings of competence can enhance intrinsic 
motivation, but only if these feelings of competence are accompanied by a sense of 
autonomy, the idea of self-determination. “Intrinsic motivations can be strengthened 
by positive feedbacks, and undermined by negative feedbacks” (p. 58). Moreover 
extrinsic, i.e. control based motivational drivers, such as rewards, threats, deadlines, 
directives or competition pressure, diminish intrinsic motivation (p. 59).  
Integrating extrinsic motivations 
Extrinsic motivations are important to get people into action, certainly if internal 
motivations are frail or absent. It will however be difficult to do so, and certainly to 
uphold those motivations and the accompanying action, if the intrinsic interest of 
people to be involved is feeble, provisional or casual, certainly if the external 
incentives become weakened or start to fade away. This is a very well known 
motivational problem. The way to solve it, according to Deci and Ryan, is to foster 
the internalization of supporting extrinsic motivations, i.e. the underlying values of 
these motivations. Their internalization will enhance personal commitment and 
identification, and the quality of engagement.  
The highest form of internalization, according to Ryan and Deci, the ultimate, 
most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation, entails that all the required 
“regulations have been fully assimilated to the self” (Ryan and Dec, 2000, p. 62; see 
also Deci and Ryan, 1985). Initially this internalization has to be ‘externally 
prompted’, and people will be do this if they know “that they are valued by significant 
others to whom they feel or want to feel connected”. But this is not all that is required. 
Another crucial step is to internalize extrinsic goals is “perceived competence… the 
idea that one understands the goals and has the skill to succeed”. However, the most 
crucial step towards real integration and not just introjection is autonomy, according 
to the authors: “only autonomy will yield integrated self-regulation… People must 
inwardly grasp its meaning and worth” (p. 64).  
Ryan and Deci specifically do not equate intrinsic motivations with (strongly) 
internalized extrinsic motivations. They in fact warn against doing so. But they show 
that the main factors that promote intrinsic motivation, i.e. competence and autonomy, 
also enhance the internalisation of extrinsic motivations. They also show that there is 
an extra, a third important factor, when it comes to the internalization of extrinsic 
motivations, i.e. endorsement of that motivation by an esteemed person, group or 
community, or society as a whole. They call this factor the ‘sense of belongingness’, 
or ‘relatedness’.  
These findings of Ryan and Deci seem to imply that these three factors can be 
used to strengthen, deepen, bridge and link extrinsic motivations. That is good news. 
However, the next task is to apply this insight wisely. We have to make sure that we 
select and enhance the right motivations, i.e. only those that increase and improve 
action for nature and biodiversity. That is not an easy task, because we know, thanks 
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to the findings of BIOMOT WP1, Schwartz, Grouzet, and Lane, that not all 
motivations -intrinsic or extrinsic- will do this, to say the least. We also know, thanks 
to them, that enhancing specific (clusters of) motivations or values will weaken 
specific other, opposite (clusters of) motivations or values. And we also know that 
extrinsic motivations, based on external control, undermine intrinsic motivations, 
even closely related ones. 
What does all this imply for the analyses of BIOMOT, at this stage especially 
those in work package 2 (WP2), which investigated 35 biodiversity project in seven 
EU countries, to trace the motivations and values of biodiversity that initiated and 
drove these projects and the individual and collective actor involved?  
Inclusive decision-making 
WP2 explicitly zoomed in on extrinsic motivations and the possibility to internalise 
them and link them up with intrinsic motivations. The reason to do so is that: 
“Sometimes policy tools supportive of intrinsic motivations are not available or the 
most appropriate tool. [And] policies based on extrinsic motivations act faster and on 
a broader scale. A mix of tools based on intrinsically motivated and extrinsically 
motivated behaviour will often be required” (Dedeurwaerdere, 2015. p. 3).  
The assumption was that participatory approaches perhaps offered the best 
entrance to realise that symbiosis. Participatory approaches offer room for (perceived) 
self-determination, and as a result of this perhaps also promise higher results than 
approaches based on purely extrinsic incentives. This last supposition, however, had 
to be handled with care, since participatory approaches turned out to be not always 
more effective. This perhaps could be partly attributed to their dependency on factors 
that negatively influenced the perceived fairness of the procedure and the perceived 
self-determination of the participants.  
The first step was to select, at random, a large sample of successful, multi-actor 
(government, business, society) biodiversity initiatives in seven EU countries. Out of 
this sample in total 35 initiatives were selected, five in each country. The initiator of 
each initiative and four key stakeholders were interviewed, by means of a 
meticulously organised questionnaire with closed and some open questions. Apart 
from the form, the initiator was also asked to participate in a qualitative life story 
interview, and a motivational card game.  
The interview-findings were submitted to two probit-models, one (P1) to analyse 
the governance arrangement model of actors who joined in for other than economic 
reasons; and another (P2) to do the same for actors who mainly joined for reasons of 
economic benefit to them. Both models were tested to find out the importance of the 
intrinsically motivated behaviour versus internalised extrinsically motivated 
behaviour, and to find contextual factors that favour or inhibit the expression of 
intrinsically motivated behaviour and the internalisation of extrinsically motivated 
behaviour.  
The results show that it indeed is possible to design successful governance 
initiatives combining intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. They also show that 
governance mechanism based on autonomy and competence- supporting context 
played a significant role for actors who joined in for other than economic reasons 
(P1). These findings are in line with those of Ryan and Deci.  
Another interesting finding is that the role of social recognition or esteem was not 
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significant. This matches the findings of both Schwartz and Grouzet, who made clear 
that the search for recognition and self-esteem belong to different sometimes even 
opposite (clusters of) motivations or goals oriented at the promotion of the common 
good.  
A next finding was that non-economic motivations to become and remain 
involved were slightly more widespread than economic motivations, but that the 
difference was not as high as perhaps expected.  
More thought-provoking but not completely unexpected either, was the finding 
that motivations, based on autonomy or a feeling of competence, are difficult to 
implement in “initiatives whose survival strongly depends on the exploitation of 
resources”, and that, “when economic benefits to participants strongly depend on 
government incentives or the selling of products, the combination of autonomous 
governance, support for autonomous competence and duty/collective aim is less likely 
to occur”.  
Overall, the most important motivation that came out of the large-scale 
comparative analysis is the role of the self-determination of the actors. Inclusive 
decision-making is crucial. That is especially true for projects where non-economic 
motivations are key (more centralized decision-making seems more appropriate for 
economically oriented projects). Bottom-up processes that take into account the 
motivations of the societal actors and stakeholders, by means of authentic dialogue, 
that are supporting the initiatives always stand central; it is all about interdependence. 
Successful initiatives amongst the 35 analysed cases became successful, due to the 
existence of effective bridging organisations -generating social learning- between 
these two above-mentioned actor groups, with organised social learning and 
knowledge exchange in an inclusive and non-coercive manner. 
Duty as a dilemma  
What we did not (yet) measure is the question whether and how specific types of 
motivations cluster and in doing so, reinforce each other and/or crowd out or weaken 
specific other (clusters of motivations). Although one result, the finding that duty as 
(an internalized) motivation can link up with an intrinsic motivation, such as 
enjoyment, is a step in that direction. However, the main conclusion to be drawn thus 
far is that internal and external motivations can link up and become mutually 
reinforcing, not that duty as such is the most suitable motivation to internalize, 
certainly if the goal is to promote widespread motivated action for biodiversity or 
nature.  
Duty in fact seems a rather unlikely candidate to realize that, at least at first sight. 
Duty is commonly defined as a claim or demand to conform, out of social, legal, 
rational or moral reasons, and as such, at least according to the model of Grouzet, the 
antipode of feelings of autonomy and competence (self-acceptance). The same 
reasoning is true for Schwartz. His value-model offers only space for duty in the 
spheres of power, achievement or conformity, which are antipodes of self-direction 
(autonomy). Duty can be internalized, according to both models, via the desire to 
comply with friends or family, fit in socially, or gain respect; in short, via the notion 
of belongingness. This is also in line with the ideas of Ryan and Deci.  
But taking that road comes with a price. The combination of autonomy and 
competence, buoyed by a feeling of belonging, is the strongest possible motivational 
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setting to move an individual into action. To translate duty into willingly and joyful 
personal motivation, specific personality traits have to be addressed which stimulate 
conformity, but thwart self-transcendence, the central quality needed to be motivated 
to act for the common good in general and more in special biodiversity and nature. 
Belongingness, the desire to fit in, can in this case act as a bridge, but only if the 
requirement to act for nature is already a central, widely established social norm, with 
which everyone has to comply who wants to fit in socially. In most if not all other 
cases duty and conformity, combined with self-orientation (Grouzet) or self-
enhancing (Schwartz) will not promote the common good, but most probably 
undermine it and by doing so weaken the possibilities to motivate people to act for 
biodiversity or nature. Not all duties are good, and many duties, even very good ones, 
are not suited to stimulate action for nature or biodiversity. They work perhaps better 
if they are not internalized, or cannot be internalized, if only because society tends to 
drum in the wrong duties or values, as discussed before in this paper. The view that 
duty does probably not offer the best approach towards motivation to act for nature is 
confirmed by our own analyses, based on a ‘motivational card game’ we developed 
and applied to find out what are the most important and what are the least important 
motivations of people acting for nature. See below for a more extended description of 
that ‘card game’. Here we just want to use to show that duty was mostly mentioned in 
the category ‘least important’.  
We, in short, need more insight in values, goals, and meanings of concrete actors 
who acted for nature and/or started up projects to stimulate others to do so. We have 
to know what triggered and stimulated them and what worked to trigger, stimulate 
and organize others. That is precisely what is done in Biomot work package 3 (WP3).  
The value of life stories 
The aim of WP 3 was to dig into the personal motivations of individuals, who act or 
did act for biodiversity/nature, or for other more directly at society oriented activities. 
About 30 in depth life story interviews were undertaken in each, 15 with 
representatives from the first category in each country, and 15 with representatives 
from the other category. 5 of the representatives of the first group were the persons 
who initiated one of the WP2 cases mentioned-above. In total we realised a bit more 
than 200 interviews. 
Each interview contained three parts (1) a qualitative life story narrative 
interview, based on a interview guide, taking about 1,5 hour; (2) a card game, taking 
about 15 minutes, to be ‘played’ at the end of the life story, asking the interviewee to 
classify and value 20 pre-given motivations; (3) and an online survey, to be filled in 
later, lasting about half an hour. 
The purpose of the life story narrative was to find the main drive of the 
interviewee, and find out when and how they were formed, in what period (of their 
live), and by what influences (by people or environment) or experiences. The 
assumption was that the habitus -the ideas, motivations and routines- of (most) people 
were formed in their younger years, and that this formation has a decisive impact on 
their motivation to act or not to act for nature/biodiversity. We distinguished, based 
on the literature, f.i. Piaget, three life-shaping periods: 0-15, 15-25 and 25 and later; 
and asked the interviewees to tell us about the life they lived in those period and their 
social and physical environments they lived in.  
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We also searched in the life story interviews and the survey for a special 
motivational drive, seen as crucial in the psychological literature: the quest of 
significance (see for more formation the Common Concept document and below). 
That quest does not necessarily have to be experienced as positive or work out 
positively. Another assumption was a particular kind of peak experiences, so-called 
environmental epiphanies, could have funnelled the interviewees into a certain 
direction, during one or more of these periods. Both ideas were especially tested in 
the survey, which also served as a control on the findings of the narratives.  
Next to the life story interview and the survey, we developed a card game, to test 
and deepen out some of the answers given by the interviewees during the life story 
interviews. The main purpose of the card game, put before the interviewee at the end 
of the interview, was to select important and less important motivations to act for 
nature, or for another case considered to be important, another so-called ‘main thing’. 
The card game contained twenty cards, with on each card one important motivation 
for people to act. The choice and formulation of these twenty motivations was based 
on the literature and our own research. Each card contained the title and a very short 
description of that motivation. The interviewee was asked to rank the cards. They had 
six possibilities, ranking from most important to least important. Those motivations 
that played no role whatsoever could be discarded.  
Formation and childhood  
WP3 delivered a huge amount of data and findings. The first, and perhaps most 
important finding, when it comes to long term policies, is that early, childhood 
contact with nature, i.e. early nature experiences, have played a crucial role in 
moulding and directing the motivations to act for nature of the majority of the 
interviewed actors for nature, in all countries. Most interviewees mention this impact, 
but it is also confirmed by the analyses of more indirect statements. These results are 
already telling, but not that surprising, since other research has already confirmed the 
important role of childhood experiences on motivations and actions later in life. The 
obvious conclusion to be drawn is that a major way to improve the motivations of 
people to act for nature later in life is to make sure that they have (frequent) contact 
with nature during childhood.  
Our interviews showed, however, that sheer contact is not enough. It became very 
clear that the character of the contact and nature count, even more than the frequency 
of contact. Some types of experience are more important than others, and some 
natural settings are better suited for these experiences. Finding this was in fact one of 
the main reason to do life story-interviews.  
Curiosity, competence and autonomy 
We found out that the majority of people who have become active for nature or 
biodiversity shared specific types of childhood nature experiences. Autonomy, 
competence and curiosity and learning played a crucial role, and the same was to a 
somewhat smaller degree true for connectivity, or in short the quest for self-
determination. This result is in line with other findings in Biomot (see above). But we 
also discovered something else. We found out that the quality and make-up of the 
quest itself (the search, or the action) were as important as the result, and, for that 
reason, also the natural setting of that quest. We will start with the last aspect.  
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The interviews make it possible to indicate what kind of nature is most suited for 
experiences that stick and engender the motivation for nature-oriented actions later in 
live. Suitable nature (= natural places) offers a platform for exploration (curiosity and 
learning); practicing autonomy (freedom), training and developing competences, 
alone or with friends (adventure); inventing and attributing new meaning (stories); 
escaping ‘beaten tracks’; and moulding new forms of connectivity with humans or 
nature. That nature has to be a place, where a child can escape, explore and transcend, 
i.e. find and test, autonomously or with peers, her or his competences (virtues) to 
engage the world, the self, and social conditioning. Good examples are brownfields, 
wastelands at the edge of cities or on deserted industrial sites. They figure 
prominently in our interviews with people who grew up in cities. Other examples are 
forests or seashores. They obviously play an important role in the stories of people 
who grew up on the country site, but also often come back in the life stories of other 
interviewees.  
Beauty and otherness 
The experiences of our motivated interviewees have even more in common. Here 
nature experiences really start to diverge from other types of experiences. Before we 
go into that, we want to stress again, that the perceived otherness of nature, the fact 
that nature is not (completely) human-made, is crucial to understand and place the 
findings we discuss below.  
A remarkable amount of the BIOMOT interviewees reported to have been 
inspired, struck or even overwhelmed, at some stage of their life, by sensation of 
beauty, connectedness, and/or otherness, transcendence, mysticism or spirituality 
when they encountered or dwelled in nature. They often clearly stated that these 
feelings of awe had stimulated or even prompted their motivation to become active 
for nature. It is clear that nature (= natural settings) has the capacity to stir feelings 
that transcend, stop or even and break up daily routines, habits, worries, and thoughts, 
and sometimes even re-direct someone path of life.  
The diversity of these experiences and their importance for those who have 
undergone them yield already very good reasons to ensure that as many people as 
possible have the opportunity to experience nature, from early childhood onwards. 
There is, however, also another compelling reason for doing this. 
The power of stories  
Humans are storytelling animals4. We not only exchange information about what is, 
but also tell stories about what is not, about imagined things, or entities. This capacity 
to tell stories, to create imagined worlds and meaning, is unique for humans and far-
reaching in its consequences. This can be illustrated by the following example given 
by Harari (2014): “No chimpanzee could ever be convinced to hand over a banana on 
the promise that this would guarantee access to the chimpanzee heaven”. Human 
beings, on the contrary, are very strongly motivated by stories about imagined things, 
creatures, places or more abstract ‘goods’ or ‘bads’. We highly appreciate motivations 
that transcend time, place, biological conditioning and other ‘curbing’ reality. Stories 
offer ideas, ideals, examples, and idols. They hold beliefs that inspire and unite                                                         
4 See Harari, Sapiens: a brief history of mankind 2011, 2014, for a recent and very instructive expounding of this idea. 
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people, even people who will never meet, and have never met. A good example is the 
widely shared belief in Jupiter in Ancient Greek and Rome. A more recent example is 
the belief in the existence of nations. Without stories people cannot function and our 
societies would break down. Stories build, stimulate and spread motivations, and 
shape shared desires.  
However, stories also have a tendency to become stiff and inflexible, and by doing 
so prevent the emergence of new stories. They have an inclination to reify, to become 
‘carved out in stone’. Especially this last aspect is important when it comes to 
stimulate motivations to act for nature.  
To give an example: suppose a dominant story is that individual happiness is the 
highest good to strive for, and that a living in a big city offers the best conditions to 
actualize that happiness, certainly if that city has a high variety of shops, catering, art 
galleries and the like; and suppose also that all these conditions are realised (literally 
carved out in stone). In that case, it becomes very difficult to motivate a broader 
public by means of stories that praise the values of rural living. This will be even 
more problematic if earlier experience of rural living is lacking, and even more so, if 
the possibility to experience rural living is limited or absent. It becomes impossible if 
the supposed audience has been immersed in the above-mentioned city discourse 
since their childhood, and has grown up in complete city-environments. 
That is the reason why compelling stories about nature are very important, and 
moreover, why we need natural environments that offer opportunities to experience 
and ‘practice’ these stories, from childhood on. We found that people who are 
motivated to act for nature have stories that stem from their earlier experiences with 
nature. We also found that nature experiences generate stories that differ in crucial 
aspects from stories that stem from non-natural environments, and that those stories 
appeal to other sensations and thoughts, often very strong epiphany-like feelings. See 
for a more in depth explanation Part III. 
Motivations to act for nature need (contact and connection with) nature to arise, 
and nature is the only platform that enables stories that transcend complete man-made 
realities and reifications, i.e. circularity. That is what all those by our interviewees 
mentioned, epiphany-like experiences tell: humans need nature to test meaning. 
Mentors 
This links up with a second crucial finding based on the analyses of the life stories: 
the role of mentors, i.e. significant others. The majority of our interviewees 
mentioned to be influenced by a mentor in their life, mostly during childhood or 
adolescence. They found and needed an example or someone who could guide them 
or show the way. Mentors, as stories, stimulate, articulate and combine intrinsic and 
extrinsic meaning. They, however, also made clear that a mentor is a special type of 
person; someone who inspires but does not imposes her or his opinion. According to 
the interviewees, their mentors had an impact on them, because they stood apart, took 
them ‘seriously, stimulated their curiosity and competence, respected or addressed 
their autonomy, showed new meanings, explained otherness, or just pointed out the 
way to new horizons, beauty, or awe. Most mentors were typically not direct parents 
or teachers, at least not teachers who’s task it was to formally teach the ‘capacity to 
respect or study nature’. This implies that implementing care for nature in the formal 
school curriculum is probably good, but not the way to promote mentorship. 
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Mentors were mainly important during childhood or adolescence. In later years 
acting for nature to benefit other people and society became more important.  
Meaning of life 
Motivations to act for nature are about meaning: giving meaning to your actions, and 
articulate meaning by acting. It is indeed a quest, as assumed before. The meaning, 
i.e. the purpose and enjoyment, is as well in, before, after and beyond the action. It is 
about more than goals or results or action in itself. It is, as several of our interviewees 
mentioned, a form of homecoming, in the sense of ‘building your home where your 
heart is’. That home can be a physical place -a very de re thing- or a feeling that 
‘things start to converge’, that life starts to make sense. The importance of feelings of 
meaning, convergence and connectedness that surpass the level of direct utility or 
happiness oriented drives, is further underlined by the findings in WP3 on 
epiphanies5.  
We found four different types of epiphanies, i.e. intellectual, realization, 
connectedness and awakening. People who are highly motivated to act for nature had 
more epiphanies than others. These epiphanies occurred during childhood or, and 
even more, in the period between 15-25 years. The group of highly motivated actors 
for nature is characterized by having more awakening and connectedness epiphanies 
than the group of others. The group of others experienced more aesthetic epiphanies, 
and these experiences happened often earlier in their life, during childhood (see more 
information our WP3 reports).  
This perspective on motivations to act for nature is not even remotely connected 
to the dominant economic and political discourse, and still a long shot from the more 
at deliberation, social justice, or value plurality oriented policy discourses discussed 
earlier. Even in those last three discourses the focus is more on efforts to reconcile 
different opinions and protect non-monetary values than on motivations that, 
according to our interview findings, demonstrably trigger people or groups into 
action.  
There is a big rift between what policy-makers belief and do and what people who 
act for nature or biodiversity mention as their main drive to act. This split is 
understandable since politics, economics and policy are always about more than 
motivations to act for nature and biodiversity alone, even in the cases where this topic 
is their main object. Even then, they have to reckon (sic) with all kind of related or 
unrelated issues, interests, arguments and actors.  
However, this answer, although understandable, falls short, if motivation is the 
issue, and we accept the idea that motivation is the key to successfully addressing and 
reversing the trend of biodiversity decline, in the EU and elsewhere, as the EU did 
when it commissioned BIOMOT to find out what really could motivate people to act 
for biodiversity. If we accept the by now proven insight that continuing to do 
‘business as usual’ or ‘removing market failures’ will not bring about the required 
motivations to act, and certainly not on a large scale.  
When it comes to creating the right conditions and environments for motivations 
to act for nature, the goal and the rules of the game, and in fact the game itself                                                         5 Environmental epiphanies have to do with the natural environment and with Nature, and they impact on a person's relationship 
with it. They are “experiences in which one’s perception of essential meaning of her/his relationship with nature shifts in a 
meaningful manner and it is usually followed by behavioral changes ” (Vining and Merrik, 2012, p. 497). 
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changes. We are no longer talking about policy, economics and politics in general, or 
about the undefeatable supremacy of existing political and economic powers, players 
and scales. In that case we are talking about policies and politics that can and will 
create and promote conditions and environments to foster, diffuse en scale up these 
indispensable motivations to act for nature. Doing this, is, as we have seen, about 
offering space to initiators; about creating proper educational, formational and natural 
environments from childhood onwards, that stimulate experiences and stories; about 
mentors; and about autonomy, curiosity and learning, relatedness and care; in short, 
about meaning and the quest for meaning.  
There is however more to it. We also have to answer the question why so many 
good initiatives remain local or confined to niches, or restricted in scale and time. 
Why do so many people decline to act or join in, even if they acknowledge the 
urgency of the problem? Why do so many people even claim that not acting, or 
denying is the best form of ‘action’?  
Answering that question requires a more systemic approach than the one that has 
followed thus far; not an answer that addresses alleged systemic causes of 
biodiversity or environmental decline, but an answer that looks at the causes and 
consequences of systemic demotivation.  
Systemic demotivation 
 
“There is nothing I can do, so the best thing is for me to do nothing” 
 
Demotivation is not simply non-motivation or the absence of a specific motivation, 
but an indication that the whole mechanism that links motivation to action is jammed. 
Or formulated otherwise: demotivation is a motivation, a special type, a kind of 
blockade or paralysis, caused by a split between the awareness that action is necessary 
and the conviction that all actions are fruitless; i.e. the feeling to be “stuck between a 
rock and a hard place”, as the expression runs.  
The notion systemic refers to the fact that demotivation is not a question of 
personality, personal preferences or personal circumstances. Motivations and 
demotivations are formed and refined over a lifetime. That is what, in BIOMOT, we 
call formation – the idea that collective and individual motivational processes are 
always socially and politically grounded and organised. Systemic demotivation is 
caused by inadequate but permanently reproduced and reified notions of the relation 
between nature and culture, ignorance of the fact that human actions are essentially 
included in natural processes, and finally the persistent illusion that nature and culture 
represent two distinct and autonomous spheres (the classic nature/culture dichotomy).  
The very core of the systemic motivational obstruction can be observed on the 
level of individuals and collectives, as well as in policymakers. This obstruction is in 
many cases intimately linked to a real dilemma: an implicit awareness that the old 
recipes and ways of environmental action are simply no longer adequate for the type 
and global scale of the ecological problems that we are facing at this point in history. 
Nevertheless, it seems that we mostly remain half way: we know that we cannot act in 
the old manner, and we know that “business as usual” is no longer possible – even in 
the conception of environmental critique. Still, at the point when we would have to 
redefine the entire relation between the human system and the natural system, we 
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instead relapse into dichotomous thinking, which (if nothing else) liberates us from 
our responsibility to act. It is precisely this combination of the right intuition and the 
disavowal of its inevitable conclusions that forms the underlying structure of the 
complex mechanism that we have described by the notion systemic demotivation.  
The various forms of systemic demotivation are in depth analysed below, in Part 
IV of this booklet. Here, however, we want to throw light on some of the principal 
conclusions.  
Systemic demotivation is above all a form of resistance, a reactive formation, to 
shield societies and individuals from the difficult task of transforming the given social 
system. It is crucial to understand that this systemic demotivation is not an anomaly 
and the absence of motivation for an environmental action, but a specific reaction and 
response to a real antagonism. Only a few decades ago, the field of ecological critique 
was dominated by the view according to which the negative human influence could be 
reduced to individual cases and types of interventions, and consequently, that acting 
for nature could be brought down to positive counter-acting, to the effort of 
preventing these individual interventions. Yet the systemic processes confronting us 
today pose an entirely new situation: global systemic change is a consequence of the 
“normal” functioning of the system, and adapting by only changing some conditions 
or intensify and upscale earlier approaches no longer is sufficient. In the epoch of the 
Anthropocene, where the “terrestrial biosphere made the transition from being shaped 
primarily by natural biophysical processes to an anthropogenic biosphere (...), shaped 
primarily by human systems,” (Ellis 2011: 1029) the revision of the nature/culture 
dichotomy is more than a matter of pure theory. This revision needs to take place both 
in the scientific sphere and in the social context, which means that the theoretical 
revision of the human relation to nature has become a matter of practical necessity, as 
far as the persistence of the dichotomy works as an obstacle to the formation of 
efficient strategies of environmental action.  
Motivational paralysis  
Precisely this insight causes the motivational paralysis. The more the destructive 
consequences of human interventions in natural environments become manifest, the 
more this manifest character feeds resistance to action and the more it legitimises the 
absence of motivation, placing humans in a position of helplessness, impotence, and 
even denial. The question is not whether the insufficiency or the absence of 
environmental motivation follows from the fact that environmental goals are not the 
only goals pursued by individuals. 6True demotivation becomes manifest when a 
contradiction emerges between two different goals that we want to pursue. In such a 
situation the most acceptable strategy for individuals is to assume the split itself. 
Rather than being directed to environmental action, people direct their mental energy 
into sustaining this split. With regard to the information they possess, “normal life” 
can no longer be lived as it was till now, and a mental investment is needed in order to 
continue to sustain the status quo in a reality that has altered its “normality”: either 
direct denial of negative information or the adoption of the illusion that, despite                                                         6 The multiplicity of different goals and interests in itself does not prevent motivation or action for nature, 
something that many cases of contemporary ecological movements, in which environmental action without any 
difficulty accompanies other social, political, economic, and finally personal goals, clearly testify to. 
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practical ignorance, the people in question do useful work already by thinking of 
environmental problems and by being concerned about the environment, even if they 
are practically doing precisely what they should not be doing.  
Of course, as far as these people are convinced that they are too powerless, as 
individuals, to take action, they become demotivated subjects, who transform their 
lack of action into virtue: There is nothing I can do, therefore the best thing is for me 
to do nothing. 
Breaking away from organised demotivation 
In order to address the question of motivation on its most fundamental level, we 
need to move from the multiplicity of motivation to the formal structure of action. The 
analysis of the BIOMOT interviews namely confronts us with the problem that was 
identified as the “contextuality” or “particularity” of motivation. However, insisting 
solely on the level of particular cases does not answer the most crucial question: What 
is the structure of motivated action, and how can this action ground a more general 
strategy to counteract the systemic demotivation?  
In the theoretical framework, this problem demands a theory of judgment in which 
a specific type of articulation between the particularity of actions and their inherent 
universal validity is at work. One of the basic insights provided by the analysis of the 
BIOMOT interviews is that the actions of the interviewees, which seem to be 
contextually determined throughout, manifest the structure of anticipated certainty. In 
the usual, instrumental type of action, the latter is structured as means X for achieving 
the desired goal Y, whereby the choice of means logically results from the rational 
analysis of the given situation: this analysis leads to certainty that in order to achieve 
Y we need to do X. In this type of univocal and consciously intentional action the 
reality of the situation precedes the action and its certainty. We can say that this type 
of action is grounded on an already pre-established cognition.  
However, in many cases the situation is entirely different and the action creates 
the conditions and the reality, which retroactively legitimises and grounds the actions 
undertaken (for this reason we speak of action as anticipated certainty). Action here 
produces the features of the situation for reason of which a person acts at all. We can 
call this the performative model of action. The same logic applies for the motivational 
structure of action. Action, so to speak, precedes its own motivation and only 
retrospectively produces its cognitive rationalisation. Motivation as the driving force 
and guidance of action results only from the process in which action produces 
consequences in reality and through them retroactively articulates and verifies the 
reasons and motivates itself. We are dealing with a singularity, for which we 
presuppose that it nevertheless possesses some universal validity and value. This 
universality, however, needs to be constructed. Let us add that the notion of 
biodiversity is a concrete case of such universality that it needs to be invented, 
grounded, and justified based on concrete and contextual cases. But to repeat again, 
this invention is the work of the reflecting power of judgment, which needs to be 
understood both as a way of thinking and a way of action. Because thinking and 
action here come together, we can recognise in this structure a specific break from 
organised demotivation. The importance of this model of action also consists in the 
fact that it overcomes the multiplicity of motivations by highlighting the structure that 
drives concrete cases of environmental engagement.  
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Policy recommendations (NB: regarding the motivations of people 
and people’s organisations, not firms, who in fact only have interests) 
 
• Create the conditions for nature oriented formation, from childhood onwards 
(education, experiences, mentorship, attachments, meaning, rituals) 
• Give space and create space for meaningful stories, examples, and practices  
• Take away the (re) production settings for systemic demotivation, and the 
accompanying discourses.  
o Do not emphasize economic values, certainly at the start-up phase of 
projects. 
 
M = F*S /D 
 
M = motivation to act (for nature) 
F = Formation 
S = stories in context 
D = systemic demotivation 
 
NB: personality and personal dispositions are subordinated when it comes to policy 
recommendations 
 
 
  
